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研究成果の概要（英文）：I study an optimal debt contracting problem and its resulting capital allocation 
with a firm confronting the asset substitution problem. Then, I show that (i) the first-best borrowing 
and allocation result is achievable when and only when the firm’s initial wealth is not less than a 
sufficient level and that (ii) the asset substitution does not occur but the optimum amount of borrowing 
is less than the first-best level when the initial wealth level is insufficient but comparatively high 
and the asset substitution does occur when it is not the case. Further, I study an effect on the 
competition outcome and then show that (i) the realization of asset substitution can increase the 
aggregate output in less competitive market and consequently heighten the social welfare as a whole and 
that (ii) a financial improvement in the asset level can damage the financial status in the cash-flow 
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